Changing Hearts And Minds: The Domestic Influence Of International tribunals by Cooper, Belinda
CHANGING HEARTS AND MINDS: THE
DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS
Belinda Cooper*
I have been observing events in Kosovo as someone interested not only in
international tribunals, but also in German history, and especially in the way in
which Germany has dealt with the legacies of World War I and the Holocaust.
A significant outcome of the Kosovo war has been the spotlight suddenly
trained on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
[ICTY], which became virtually a household word following the indictment of
Slobodan Milosevic. This event underscored the increasing tendency to look
to an international court to provide justice in the aftermath of brutal conflicts.
Looked at in light of the German experience, however the only example we
have to date of the long-term effects of post-conflict international prosecution
on a society the issue becomes more complicated. The question that particu-
larly interests me involves the extent to which an international court can
exercise an influence within the country whose case it is considering be it
Germany, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda or any other. I would like to highlight
what I believe are some of the limitations on the domestic impact of an
international court, using Germany's experience as a basis, and why our
expectations should therefore perhaps be lowered or made more realistic with
regard to such tribunals. I will also suggest ways in which the modem
international criminal tribunals are behaving differently from the Nuremberg
tribunal, as well as ways in which they should behave in order to increase their
impact. Finally, I will briefly mention what I think international criminal courts
can accomplish why they remain important regardless of their domestic effect.
Perhaps because the criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were in part responses to the failure of the world community to prevent
violence in those countries, and also perhaps because human rights activists had
been working so long and hard to make them a reality, the tribunals have
become something of a repository for the hopes disappointed by the interna-
tional political system. In speaking and writing about the tribunals, commenta-
tors have suggested they can prevent collective resentments by individualizing
guilt. By revealing irrefutable facts and truths, they can prevent the develop-
ment of new myths about conflicts and thus, contribute to breaking the cycle of
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violence. Additionally, they can contribute to reconciliation by ensuring justice
to victims, and ultimately can help establish peace. This view of their functions
does not appear to have abated with the Kosovo war. If anything, even more
hopes attach to the tribunal now that its credibility seems strengthened and it
commands greater respect and more resources. A further factor in this
development may be the chastening realization that even when the international
community does at last intervene, it cannot resolve all problems which again
turns attention toward the international tribunal as a source of hope.
But I believe we ask too much of the international tribunals if we expect
them to have an impact of this magnitude within the country for which they are
created. While it is true that today's courts are different from the Nuremberg
tribunal, some of the fundamental issues remain the same, as do the limitations
on the court. This is not to suggest that tribunals serve no purpose, but that
their purpose is not domestic. They do not exist to cure internal problems of
transition or to rehabilitate a country, though every case is different and they
may, in fortunate cases, play some such role.' Attempting to ascribe broad
curative powers to international courts misunderstands their function and
carries with it the danger that, should they fail to accomplish the lofty purposes
imagined for them, they may become targets of frustration generated by
renewed disappointment. Additionally, requiring too much of these judicial
organs risks abdicating political responsibility.
This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the Nuremberg tribunals,
about which so much has been written.2 However, a brief listing of some of its
flaws is merited, in order to better understand some of the reasons it was not
accepted in Germany, and to allow discussion of what the present-day
international tribunals have done and can do to avoid similar pitfalls.
Nuremberg was looked upon as victors' justice by many because of the
composition of the bench, made up of Allied judges alone. It was considered
hypocritical due to the presence of the Soviet Union among the judges, despite
its own documented war crimes and crimes against humanity. Crimes like the
Katyn massacre, known to have been perpetrated by the Soviets, were
purposely ignored by the tribunal. Germans, in particular, also objected to what
they saw as the ex poste facto nature of the laws the tribunal applied.
In part because of these problems, the Tribunal's effect within Germany
was limited. It did not, as has sometimes been asserted in its favor, force most
Germans to confront the crimes committed in their name, if not by them. While
1. The attempted prosecution of Augusto Pinochet of Chile by a Spanish court has had a
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Although it does not involve an international tribunal, this is an example of the positive effect international
prosecutions might also have, given the right context.
2. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OFTHENUREMBERG TRIALS (1992); Robert E. Conot,
JUsTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983) .. , among many other accounts.
the Tribunal did serve to establish irrefutable truths as a legacy for later
generations, these truths were frequently rejected by average Germans after the
war; or if accepted, they were not considered to possess personal significance.
There was little internalization of remorse. The first trial at Nuremberg, the
International Military Tribunal, did bring a measure of justice, at least in regard
to a small number of top perpetrators. However, the political choice of the
defendants somewhat tarnished this record, as did some of the sentencing
decisions. Furthermore, most of the defendants convicted at the twelve
American follow-up trials were released by the mid-1950s, largely for political
reasons, as the United States courted West Germany as a Cold War ally.
Germany's leaders in fact insisted on their release as a condition for alliance.3
Scholars have shown that German courts expressly refused to acknowledge the
validity of any of the Nuremberg convictions.4
While new concepts of law began to enter Germanjurisprudence following
the war, in part as a result of Nuremberg, it would take time for them to make
significant inroads. In the meantime, though trials were held in Germany in the
immediate post-war period, they did not often result in truejustice. Thejudicial
system was staffed mainly by holdovers from the old regime, essentially
judging themselves; and their unwillingness to condemn their own back-
grounds, along with their concept of positive law, led to much judicial
reinterpretation and manipulation of both laws and facts to prevent criminals
from suffering severe penalties.' The attitude was summed up in the words of
one post-war German politician who, defending his actions as ajudge under the
Nazis, argued, "What was legal then cannot be illegal now."
Thus the impact of Nuremberg on the post-war German legal system,
though not non-existent, was limited and this despite Germany's unique
situation, subject to occupation by the Allies and their attempts to reeducate in
the early post-war years. It was not until much later, in the course of Ger-
many's development over the years, that German law would embrace the
Nuremberg approach to law and justice as, for example, in its methods of
dealing legally with members of the East German leadership and border guards
responsible for the killings at the East German border.6
3. See Peter Maguire, Nuremberg: A Cold War Conflict of Interest, in WAR CRIMES: THE
LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 67-86 (Belinda Cooper, ed., 1999).
4. See Jdrg Friedrich, Nuremberg and the Germans, IN WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG, 102-105 (Belinda Cooper, ed., 1999).
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AMNESTIE: NS-TATER IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK (1994).
6. In a number of cases, border guards and higher officials of the East German government have
been convicted of human rights violations despite the fact that their actions did not technically violate East
German law at the time; the courts have used arguments that incorporate international humanitarian law.
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In addition to these legal obstacles, Germany in the 1950s and 1960s also
faced social obstacles to a full reckoning with the Nazi past. Postwar Allied
attempts at denazification essentially came to an end with the onset of the Cold
War, and many former Nazis retained their positions in government and at all
levels of society. There was thus little incentive for them to confront their
complicity with the Nazi regime; the legal and medical professions, for
example, took years to begin this process. Though Germany has paid millions
of dollars in reparations to many victims, there was (and in fact continues to be)
a great deal of resistance to these payments. They were originally instituted at
the insistence of the Western allies, whose ranks Germany hoped to join.7
The Tribunal did not reconcile Germans with their victims or their victims
with them, though Germany differed from some of the more modern conflicts
for which reconciliation is often discussed: most of the victims were either
dead or had left the country. (In this way, it perhaps most closely resembled
"ethnically cleansed" regions such as parts of the former Yugoslavia). The few
Jews who remained were physically protected, but because of the general
failure of postwar German society to acknowledge guilt or responsibility, there
could be little in the way of psychological or social reconciliation. Other
victims of Nazism (Gypsies, homosexuals, Communists) were marginalized or
not acknowledged at all.
Germany today is admittedly a very different place than it was in the first
Cold War decades. It has become one of the most introspective of nations,
undergoing an almost obsessive process of self-examination that is exemplary
and probably unique. But this change happened for reasons largely independent
of the international prosecutions. Domestic legal proceedings against
concentration camp guards in the late 1950s had some effect; but a society-wide
process of questioning began in earnest only with the student upheavals of the
late 1960s, during which young people confronted their parents' silence about
the past. This process was largely a function of changes in social and political
institutions, education, and most importantly, the change in generations that
permitted greater distance, and thus a greater ability to deal honestly with the
past.
It must also be remembered that we are speaking here only of the
perpetrators (and their descendants), and the attempts they have made to come
to terms with their own past. Over fifty years after the events, the feelings of
the victims and their descendents, within and outside of Germany, remain
complicated, and their relationship with the perpetrator society is far from
resolved!
7. [sources on reparations].
8. For a skeptical view of the usefulness of international tribunals for victims, see Julie Mertus,
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This history leads me to believe that we must be more realistic about the
probable effects of today's tribunals. These tribunals are simply not created,
at least in the short run, for the sake of the societies whose crimes they are
dealing with. They may well provide victims with a degree of vindication and
empowerment; but they are unlikely to have much effect on the immediate
situation the relationship between victims and victimizers, or the way the
victimizers deal with their complicity. Convicting those responsible for
atrocities in Kosovo will not make Yugoslans more willing to face unpleasant
truths.
Of course, there are differences between the Nuremberg tribunal and the
current tribunals, and the context, too, is different. The fact that the current
tribunals are truly international, and not composed solely of representatives of
victorious or stronger powers, gives them greater hope of legitimacy in the eyes
of those at whom they are directed. Also, at least in the Yugoslavia case, the
fact that indictees have come from all sides in the conflict increases the
tribunal's chances of acceptance. The tribunal's willingness to at least look at
NATO's activities during the Kosovo war, even though this is unlikely to lead
to any indictments, also tends to make it more credible. The Rwanda tribunal,
which has indicted only Hutu thus far, lags in this respect.
Less resistance exists today to the law being implemented by the tribunals.
It was relatively easy for Germans, with their positivist legal tradition, to deny
the legitimacy of the apparently retroactive laws under which they were being
prosecuted: But developments over the past fifty years, including the large
number of concrete international instruments, have made it difficult to deny the
reality of international humanitarian law; most countries are party to one or
another treaty or convention.
Nuremberg might have had a greater immediate impact in Germany at least
to the extent of keeping former Nazis out of public office had the political
situation of the day been different. However, exigencies of the Cold War
required that Germany be wooed as an ally against the Soviet Union, preventing
a consistent policy against members of the old regime and those complicit in its
policies. But the problem of politics persists today. The political community
did avoid repeating the post-Nuremberg situation by excluding indicted war
criminals at Dayton, but the lack of will to arrest current indictees is a new
political hurdle. Also, the indictment of Milosevic could not help leaving an
impression of political manipulation, however unjustified, coming as it did at
the height of the NATO campaign against him. The failure to indict Croatian
leader, Franjo Tudjman, for his role in the wars in the former Yugoslavia may
have left a similar impression. Lack of consistency that can be interpreted as
political makes it even less likely that a tribunal will have an impact in the
CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG, 229-243 (Belinda Cooper, ed., 1999).
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country upon which its investigations are focused. Here tribunals could utilize
public relations and educational tools to increase the chance of influencing, or
at least being heard by, the populations of these countries.
There is an additional point, though, that is more difficult to remedy and
which should be mentioned in connection with both Nuremberg and the current
tribunals. This is the issue of individualizing guilt, which is the main point of
a criminal tribunal concerned with accountability and an end to impunity. A
tribunal fixes guilt on individuals, particularly those at the top; but crimes such
as those committed in Germany, Rwanda, and to some extent the former
Yugoslavia are often mass crimes, abetted and/or condoned by a majority in the
country. Pinning guilt on individual leaders may have two effects. It may
allow transference of guilt by those who were complicit: it wasn't me, they can
say, it was those at the top, and now that they've been dealt with, I have no need
to worry about the past or consider its connection to me. Or, it can lead to
denial and to identification with those on trial, a sense of wrongful persecution.
Germans responded to Nuremberg and its successor trials in both these ways.
Obviously, neither response is constructive to the kind of domestic processes
truth-finding, ensuring justice, or beginning reconciliation that are generally
considered desirable after a period of conflict. Mass crimes thus cannot be
dealt with exclusively through individualized legal proceedings. By concentrat-
ing on individual top perpetrators, such proceedings can even be counterproduc-
tive to a goal within the country of confronting and dealing with the past, by
giving the majority a way to keep from facing its own complicity. Here, once
again, tribunals cannot be looked upon as a major part of the domestic healing
process.
None of this makes international tribunals any less important. Tribunals
sanction the behavior of leaders, establish their accountability for their actions,
and make it clear that internationally recognized crimes cannot be committed
with impunity. Assuming that enforcement can be ensured, it is to be hoped
they will act as a deterrent against future crimes. And they serve to develop a
system of internationally agreed upon values and legal norms, with all the
social, psychological, and political impact these can have. All of these are
highly desirable goals that need not be developed at length here. My point is
that we should not imagine a court to be more than a court. It may, but will not
necessarily, contribute to healing damaged societies. But it cannot provide
national psychotherapy and it may not even be widely accepted. A country's
"rehabilitation," in the sense of internalized comprehension of and remorse for
wrongs committed, is less likely to come about as a result of the external
pressure of court decisions than to develop gradually from within. As in
Germany, I believe, outcomes within a country that will permit it to move
forward true confrontation with the past, admission of complicity, and some
form of reconciliation, whatever that may mean or require demand quite
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different approaches from those of a tribunal. In the wake of Kosovo, as the
international tribunal takes a greater hand in post-conflict developments, we
should simply remain aware that at least as history has so far shown a tribunal
can only do so much, and should only be expected to do so much.
